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Abstract 
Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS) has been developed as an alternative weapon system in 
the battlefield. It has a fundamental difference with other weapon systems which lies in the 
decision making carried out without human intervention. AWS is able to take decisions about 
life and death and has been legally, morally and ethically challenged. However, as a smart 
weapon, it gives significant advantage since it can be deployed in very danger areas for human 
being in the battlefield for the purpose of self-defense in critical situation. This article argues 
that AWS is still a conventional weapon and its use cannot be absolutely prohibited even if it is 
deemed as a vulnerable and destructive weapon which potentially violates international 
humanitarian law (IHL). AWS can fully comply with IHL basic principles for as long as there is a 
sufficient legal basis that regulates the limit and legality of its use. Accordingly, as a ‘modern’ 
smart weapon, this article suggests that the future AWS regulation should be followed by 
appropriate technical provisions on the AWS’ development, production, ownership, transfer and 
use in armed conflict. 
Keywords: Armed Conflict, Autonomous Weapon Systems, International Humanitarian Law, 
Weapon Regulation 
 
 
Penggunaan Autonomous Weapon Systems dalam Konflik Bersenjata:  
Legalitas dan Prospek Pengaturannya 
 
Abstrak 
Sistem Senjata Otonom (AWS) telah dikembangkan sebagai sistem senjata alternatif dalam 
pertempuran dan memiliki perbedaan fundamental dengan sistem senjata lain yaitu, keputusan 
yang diambil tanpa adanya intervensi manusia. AWS mampu untuk memutuskan hidup dan 
matinya target kombatan sehingga penggunaannya ditentang bagik secara hukum, moral, dan 
etika karena berpotensi merusak moral dan etika dalam peperangan. Namun demikian, sebagai 
senjata modern, AWS memberikan keuntungan yang nyata mengingat AWS dapat ditempatkan 
di daerah yang berbahaya bagi manusia untuk alasan bela diri dalam situasi yang sangat sulit. 
                                                     
PADJADJARAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW Volume 3 Number 2 Year 2019 [ISSN 2549-2152] [e-ISSN 2549-1296] 
 
*  LL.B degree in International Law  at Law Faculty Padjadjaran University, Bandung, West Java, Indonesia. 
Padjadjaran Journal of International Law  
Volume 3, Number 2, June 2019  
  
 
132 
Penelitian ini menyatakan bahwa AWS tetap merupakan senjata konvensional yang 
penggunaannya tidak dapat dilarang secara absolut sekalipun berpotensi menjadi senjata 
penghancur yang dapat melanggar hukum humaniter. AWS mampu untuk mematuhi prinsip-
prinsip dasar hukum humaniter sepanjang pengaturan dan pembatasan penggunaannya diatur 
dalam instrumen hukum humaniter yang memadai yang hingga saat ini belum tersedia. Dengan 
demikian,  penelitian ini menyarankan bahwa aturan AWS masa depan harus juga mencakup 
aturan-aturan teknis tentang pengembangan, pembuatan, kepemilikan, pengalihan serta 
penggunaan dari AWS dalam sengketa bersenjata.  
   
Kata KuncI: Aturan Senjata, Konflik Bersenjata, Hukum Humaniter Internasional, Sistem Senjata 
Otonom 
 
A. Introduction 
War, technology, and principles of law 
governing armed conflict have influenced 
one another.  A modern technology military 
weapons are developed to give more 
protection to people and prevent 
undesirable consequences.1 Technological 
development has changed the way of 
waging war which brings greater 
responsibility to each party to the conflict 
since it can give significant contribution 
whilst also potentially violate international 
humanitarian law (IHL) because of the 
remote human operation such as 
Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV). 
However,  
The process of weapons innovation 
plays an important role to reduce 
humanitarian violations at all levels of 
conflict. One weapon that recently 
developed is Autonomous Weapon Systems 
(AWS). The development of AWS is part of a 
continuous process of technological 
innovation and developed as the primary 
technology in future warfare.2 International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) defined 
                                                     
1  Jesper Ryberg, “Technology and Personal Moral Responsibility”, on Jan Kyrre Berg Olsen (eds.), A Companion to the 
Philosophy of Technology, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Oxford, 2009, p. 476. 
2  Advisory Council on International Affairs and Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law Report, 
“Autonomous Weapon Systems: The Need for Meaningful Human Control”, No. 97 AIV/No. 26 CAVV, October 2015, p. 8; 
see also: Ingvild Bode and Hendrik Huelss, “Autonomous Weapon Systems in Changing Norms in International Relations”, 
Review of International Studies, Vol. 44, No. 3, p. 393. 
3  ICRC, “Views of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on Autonomous Weapon System”, Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), Geneva – 
Switzerland, 11-15 April 2016, p. 1.  
4  Kenneth Anderson and Matthew Waxman, “Law and Ethics for Autonomous Weapon Systems: Why a Ban Won’t Work and 
How the Laws of War Can”, Jean Perkins Task Force on National Security and Law, Hoover Institution – Stanford University, 
2013, p. 4-5. 
5  Human Rights Watch [“HRW”] and International Human Rights Clinic [“IHRC”], Losing Humanity: The Case against Killer 
Robots, Human Rights Watch, United States of America, 2012, p. 2.  
6  Predator RQ-1, Predator MQ-1, and Reaper MQ-9 are RPAS and UCAV. 
AWS as, “all weapons systems with 
autonomy in its functions, that can select, 
search, detect, identify or track, and attack 
(use of force, neutralize, damage or 
destroy) targets without human 
intervention.”3 This definition has a 
fundamental difference compared to UCAV 
(widely known as a drone). Both UCAV and 
AWS allow humans not to be physically 
present on the battlefield, but UCAV still has 
to be operated directly by a pilot as the 
operator. UCAV or Remotely Piloted Aircraft 
System (RPAS) are now increasingly 
automated in their flight functions, such as 
take-off and landing, but they still need real-
time human pilots to fly and shoot.4 Based 
on these comparisons, the weapon system 
level of autonomy are vary and they divide 
into three different categories based on 
human involvement:5 
1. Human-in-the-Loop Weapons (Semi-
AWS)6: Robots that can choose targets 
and send attacks only by human 
command such as UCAV; 
Andreas Wilia 
The Use of Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS) in Armed Conflict: 
Legality and Challenges for Future Weapon Regulation 
 
 
 
133 
2. Human-on-the-Loop Weapons (Human-
Supervised Weapon Systems)7: Robots 
that can choose targets and send 
attacks under the supervision of human 
operators and capable to abort the 
robot's actions; 
3. Human-out-of-the-Loop Weapons 
(AWS)8: Robots that can choose targets 
and attack without interaction and 
input from humans. 
The use of AWS in armed conflict will 
greatly affect the nature of future warfare. 
This has attracted the attention of Human 
Rights Watch (HRW). In November 2012, 
HRW released report on "Losing Humanity: 
The Case against Killer Robots".9 This report 
contained criticisms against AWS and 
sparked important debate over the validity 
of excluding human operator during the 
decision-making process for a deadly 
attack.10  
The impact of AWS lies in the decision of 
the attack taken by the robot itself, 
eliminating human decisions and actions in 
carrying out the execution of the attack.11 
Concerns are based on the task of machines 
or systems that make life or death decisions 
without human intervention.12 Many 
examples illustrate that the more 
sophisticated a weapon, the more 
                                                     
7 Anti-aircraft systems (Aegis Combat System), anti-
missile systems (Iron Dome), CIWS (Phalanx 
System), C-RAM (Centurion, Dutch Goalkeeper 
System) are examples of defensive and 
independent human-supervised AWS, which can 
select and engage target in accordance with the 
programmed. Human operators continue to carry 
out supervision in the weapons operation and can 
take over the weapons system if needed within a 
certain period of time. 
8  Samsung Techwin SGR-A1, DoDaam’s Super aEgis II, 
Roeh-Yoreh (“Sees-Fires”), and Loitering Munitions; 
see also: United Nations General Assembly 
[“UNGA”], “Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary execution, 
Christof Heynes”, Human Rights Council, 
A/HRC/23/47, 9 April 2013, p. 8-10; Maya Brehm, 
Defending the Boundary: Constraints and 
Requirements on the Use of Autonomous Weapon 
Systems under International Humanitarian and 
Human Rights Law, The Geneva Academy of 
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, 
Geneva, 2017, p. 16-8. 
9  Michael N. Schmitt and Jeffrey S. Thurnher, “’Out of 
Loop’: Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Law 
principles of IHL are sacrificed. On the other 
hand, sophisticated weapons and modern 
technology are expected to reduce 
casualties of civilians and combatants. 
Therefore, this article states that the use of 
AWS is in accordance with IHL principles as 
long as some IHL limitations are applied. 
Accordingly, legally binding instrument is 
necessary to prevent this smart weapon 
from violating IHL principles.  
 
B. The Use Of Autonomous Weapon 
Systems Under International 
Humanitarian Law 
Dr. Armin Krishnan stated that the Killer 
Robot or AWS has intelligence that allows it 
to actively searching target and has abilities 
to make decisions to kill or not to kill its 
targets.13 Basically, technology in weapons 
is neutral and does not have preferences on 
friends or foe, however human involvement 
in design and development that determines 
the weapon technical aspect during war as 
reflected in the term "guns don't kill people, 
people kill people".14 However, AWS has 
challenges within it use, such as:15 
a) AWS does not have a human quality 
judgment to assess a person's intent (a 
threat or not). 
of Armed Conflict”, Harvard National Security 
Journal, Vol. 4, 2013, p. 231. 
10  Ibid. 
11  UNGA, Op.cit., p. 5. 
12  Convention on Certain Conventional Weapon 
(CCW) Meeting of High Contracting Parties, “Report 
of the 2015 Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal 
Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS)”, 
CCW/MSP/2015/3, Geneva – Switzerland, 12-13 
November 2015, para. 13. 
13  Armin Krishnan, Killer Robots: Legality and 
Ethicality of Autonomous Weapons, Ashgate 
Publishing Limited, Surrey, 2009, p. 33. 
14 Andrew Feenberg, “What is Philosophy of 
Technology?”, available at: 
https://www.sfu.ca/~andrewf/books/What_is_Phil
osophy_of_Technology.pdf (accessed on 26 
January 2019). 
15  HRW and IHRC”, Losing Humanity: The Case against 
Killer Robots, Op.cit., p. 30-6; see also: UNGA, 
“Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, 
summary or arbitrary execution, Christof Heynes”, 
Op.cit., p. 18. 
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b) The number of scenarios will disrupt 
AWS ability to analyze and comply with 
the provisions of proportionality. 
Proportionality in an attack must be 
determined subjectively based on a 
case-by-case basis. 
c) AWS are vulnerable to hacking and it 
could be used by non-State actors 
(cartels or individuals) against the State, 
other non-State actors, or civilians. 
d) Identifying enemies that have become 
hors de combat could be challenges 
since it requires human judgment to 
determine whether the target was 
injured, needed medical treatment, or 
faked an injury. 
Thus, AWS must comply with IHL's key 
principles as means of warfare in respond to 
criticism on the deployment of AWS. The 
description below will analyze whether the 
use of AWS in armed conflict is in 
accordance with the IHL principle of law. 
 
1. Principle of Military Necessity 
The principle of military necessity is 
one of the core principles in armed 
conflict to ensure attacks or weapons 
generate minimum damage and 
injuries to the military.16 Military 
necessity permits subject to the law of 
war to apply any amount and kind of 
force effectively and efficiently.17 
Attacks must be directed at legitimate 
targets using effective military 
resources and there is no room for 
errors.18 
AWS has a significant role in 
military weaponry and perform a 
                                                     
16  Viola Vincze, “Taming the Untameable: The Role of 
Military Necessity in Constraining Violence”, ELTE 
Law Journal, Vol. 2, 2016, p. 94. 
17  Weapons Law Encyclopedia, “Necessity”, available 
at: 
http://www.weaponslaw.org/glossary/necessity-
definition-under-international-law (accessed on 3 
July 2019). 
18  Yishai Beer, “Humanity Considerations Cannot 
Reduce War’s Hazards Alone: Revitalizing the 
Concept of Military Necessity”, European Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 26, No. 4, 2016, p. 805. 
19  Paul Scharre, “The Opportunity and Challenge of 
Autonomous Systems”, on Andrew P. Williams and 
solution on poor human judgment that 
influenced by their emotions. The use 
of AWS can increase the strength of 
armed forces in the military operation 
in aspects of speed, agility, accuracy, 
persistence, range, coordination and 
greater mass, which is hard for human 
to match such superiority.19 Until now, 
AWS still unable to replace humans on 
the battlefield, but it is used to reduce 
human forces on a life-threatening 
situation, such as checkpoints that are 
prone to suicide bombers. 
AWS is different from other 
sophisticated weapons in terms of 
advantages.20 Weapons with 
autonomous systems can increase 
efficiency in military operations and 
reduce the negative effect of war. Its 
advantages start from reducing 
excessive damage, increase military 
mission success, and reducing the risk 
of civilian and military casualties. The 
use of AWS can weaken the enemy's 
military power and launch the attack 
immediately with the minimum risk of 
military resources that contributes to 
significant military advantages.21 
Military in every operation always 
considers the safety of it soldier, 
differences between human and 
machine is machines cannot "die". As a 
result, there are no sacrifices for 
suicide missions and could operate in a 
harsh environment. For example, 
seeing the condition of barbed wire 
and an armed guard at the target 
perimeter, AWS could perform a 
Paul D. Scharre (eds.), Autonomous Systems: Issues 
for Defence Policymakers, Autonomous Systems: 
Issues for Defence Policymakers, NATO 
Headquarters Supreme Allied Commander 
Transformation, Virginia, 2015, p. 3. 
20  Nathan Leys, “Autonomous Weapon Systems and 
International Crisis”, Strategic Studies Quarterly, 
Vol. 12, No. 1, 2018, p. 55. 
21  Luke A. Whittemore, “Proportionality Decision 
Making in Targeting: Heuristics, Cognitive Biases, 
and the Law”, Harvard National Security Journal, 
Vol. 7, 2016, p. 590-1. 
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precision attack with minimum risk of 
military casualties. 
Potential damage will definitely 
occur when using all types of weapons, 
AWS or semi-AWS. The fundamental 
difference between the two systems 
lies in the level of human intervention 
and need time to make a decision to 
launch an attack or defend in critical 
situations.22 Weapon information 
processing operating systems has a 
speed that is difficult for humans to 
match in terms of understanding, 
assessment, and decision-making 
process. The advantages of AWS can be 
seen in several military operations 
scenarios such as quick response 
attack or defend in a threating 
situation and operation can still be 
carried out by the time communication 
between weapons and humans is 
interrupted or cannot be connected.23 
 
2. Principle of Humanity 
AWS main issues are related to the 
principle of humanity are based on the 
concern of excessive injury, 
unnecessary suffering and weapon 
reliability.24 This principle is one of the 
first and main objectives that must be 
carried out by all parties to the conflict 
since war is well known for its 
devastating effect on human life and 
properties. To reduce the impact on 
human life, high-technology weaponry 
is needed as a means of warfare. The 
comparison can be seen in the United 
States (U.S.) Central Intelligence 
Agency drone program in Pakistan.25 
Political scientist Avery Plaw’s 
concluded that the ratio of civilian 
casualties to drone attacks is only 
twenty percent, whereas conventional 
                                                     
22  Raine Sagramsingh, “Lethal Autonomous Weapons 
Systems: Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy”, 
Journal of Engineering and Public Policy 
Washington Internships for Students in Engineering, 
Vol. 22, 2018, p. 33. 
23  Paul Scharre, “Autonomous Weapons and 
Operational Risk”, Ethical Autonomy Project Center 
for a New American Security, February 2016, p. 23. 
military conflict is estimated to have 
resulted in thirty to eighty percent of 
civilian casualties. Thus, the use of 
drones (smart weapons) is better in 
fulfilling humanitarian principles 
considering the fact that there are 
fewer civilian deaths compared to the 
traditional means of warfare. 
The principle of humanity must be 
formed on a case-by-case basis to 
determine whether an attack excessive 
or not, based on the method and type 
of weapon. For example, Samsung 
SGR-A1 can be an alternative weapon 
with AWS technology using rubber 
bullet ”kinetic impact munitions” 
rather than live ammunition. Rubber 
bullet for sentry weapon types is useful 
for paralyzing individual enemies but 
not killing or injuring excessively. Thus, 
the paragraph below will analyze AWS 
capabilities based on the principle of 
distinction and proportionality. 
a. Principle of Distinction 
Article 51 of AP I stated that civilians 
must be protected against all threat 
during military operations and 
prohibit direct attacks without 
distinguish between civilians and 
combatants. International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) through its 1996 
Advisory Opinion on the Legality of 
Nuclear Weapons stated that the 
principles and provisions in armed 
conflict on the basis of humanity 
are subject to certain conditions, in 
this case, means of war which 
preclude any distinction between 
civilian and military targets or cause 
unnecessary suffering are 
prohibited.26 Prohibition against 
indiscriminate attack derives from 
24  Article 35(2) Additional Protocol I [“AP I”]. 
25  Kelly Cass, “Autonomous Weapons and 
Accountability: Seeking Solutions in the Law of 
War”, Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, Vol. 48, 
No. 1017, 2015, p. 1039. 
26  International Court of Justice [“ICJ”] Reports, 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, para. 95. 
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the principle of distinction. 
Indiscriminate attacks are: 
a) Attacks are not directed at 
specific military objectives. 
b) Weapons which cannot be 
directed to specific military targets. 
c) Means of warfare effects of 
which cannot be limited as required 
by IHL. 
HRW Report did not consider 
AWS as a weapon that has the 
ability to distinguish civilians from 
combatants or military objects from 
civilian objects and HRW concludes 
that AWS incapable to comply with 
IHL on the basis of inadequate 
human quality judgments.27 There 
are several things that can be 
considered in respond to HRW 
concerns and other parties who 
refuse of using AWS. The following 
describes the worthiness of using 
AWS as means of warfare in 
accordance with the principle of 
distinction. 
First, recent main equipment 
and weapon systems are more than 
just identifying individuals or 
objects. Modern sensors have 
changed the way of war is fought 
with its ability to determine the 
object material, compile data from 
the acquire target, cut off 
communication lines, and identify 
individual visually through AWS 
software. The ability of sensors lies 
from infrared cameras, heat 
sensors, and sensors that can 
detect visually from uniforms and 
weapons used by the military, 
which supported by technological 
                                                     
27  Michael N. Schmitt, “Autonomous Weapon 
Systems and International Humanitarian Law: A 
Reply to the Critics”, Harvard National Security 
Journal Features, 2013, p. 12; see also: HRW and 
IHRC, Op.cit., p. 63. 
28  Department of the Army, Engineering Design 
Handbook: Army Weapon Systems Analysis, Part 
Two, US Army Materiel Development and 
Readiness Command, Virginia, 1979, p. 27-15; see 
also: NATO Advisory Group for Aerospace Research 
intelligence to detect military 
equipment such as tanks, artillery, 
military bases, and others. In 
certain cases, a weapon needs to be 
equipped with more than one 
sensor that supports each other to 
detect targets in various situations. 
For example, the Suchzünder-
Munition für die Artillerie Precision-
Guided Munition (PGM) 155mm 
has two sensors, namely, infrared 
sensors and millimeter wave radar 
sensors. Infrared sensors have 
limitations to perform in humid, 
fog, cloudy or smoke conditions, at 
that time, the millimeter wave 
radar sensor steps in such 
conditions.28 In addition, sensors 
can also work to detect threats in a 
short time and can attack targets 
effectively based on where the 
threat was launched. The use of 
various kinds of sensors as 
detection devices is one way to 
distinguish targets to be attacked. 
Second, sensor capacity has a 
major contribution to detect 
military equipment in order to 
support AWS attack a "dual-use 
object", which is objects used for 
civilian and military purposes, for 
example, railroads and bridges that 
can be used as civilians connecting 
routes for civilians or alternate 
route for military logistics 
distribution.29 Basically, civilian 
object lose its protection in the 
situation where military equipment 
is placed on civilian object or 
distributed using civilian object. 
Therefore, AWS can attack the 
and Development, “Precision Guided Munitions: 
Technology and Operational Aspects”, AGARD-CP-
320, Papers Presented at the Guidance and Control 
Panel 34th Symposium, Norway, 4-7 May 1982, p. 
10-10. 
29  XIXth International Red Cross Conference, Draft 
Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by 
the Civilian Population in Time of War, ICRC, 
Geneva, 1956, Annex Article 7 paragraph 2. 
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target since principle of distinction 
does not protect civilian objects 
from military attacks when each 
objects which by their nature, 
location, purpose or use make an 
effective contribution to military 
action (legitimate military 
objective).30  
Third, weapons operation in 
some cases related to human error 
and caused an incident. As in 1994 
“friendly fire" incident, the U.S. Air 
Force F-15 pilot misidentified two 
U.S. Army Black Hawk UH-60 
helicopters as Iraqi military forces 
which left 26 people dead.31 This 
case has shown that errors did not 
occur technically, but involved 
human operators through complex 
military command and control 
structures involving technology 
systems.32 
Friendly-fire incident or human 
errors on the battlefield are often 
affected by emotions and human 
perceptions that influence decision 
making. In contrary, AWS basically 
has no emotions and human 
perception, only relying on data 
information and sensors to 
measure the attack. The sensors 
possessed by weapons must be able 
to be relied upon to distinguish 
combatants and civilians. Humans 
have the same weakness as with 
sensors, which can violate the 
provisions of IHL with mistakes that 
are realized or miscalculate. 
                                                     
30  Article 52(2) AP I. 
31  Peter B. Ladkin and Jörn Stuphorn, “Two Causal 
Analyses of the Black Hawk Shootdown during 
Operation Provide Comfort”, available at: 
http://rvs.uni-
bielefeld.de/publications/Reports/ladkin-
SCS03.pdf (accessed on 25 January 2019). 
32  United States General Accounting Office, Operation 
Provide Comfort: Review of U.S. Air Force 
Investigation of Black Hawk Fratricide Incident 
(GAO/OSI-98-4), United States General Accounting 
Office, Washington, D.C., 1997, p. 2. 
33  Robin Geiß, The International-Law Dimension of 
Autonomous Weapons Systems, Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung, Berlin, 2015, p. 14. 
Humans can be affected by stress, 
anger, and fear that make it easy to 
confront and trigger the violations 
of IHL.33 Professor Marco Sassóli 
believes the criteria of IHL are 
objective criteria and that criteria 
could be entered into a computer 
program and it could be for 
autonomous weapon advantages 
and it will always do what human 
programmed.34 Sensor technology 
has the ability to distinct target and 
therefore AWS can be deployed as 
long as it is used in a proper and 
reasonable manner. 
b. Principle of Proportionality 
Consideration in attacking targets 
must be assessed whether the 
attack was excessive in case of 
military advantages anticipated. 
Basically IHL cannot prevent any 
losses as a consequence of war 
however every effort is made to 
avoid civilian casualties. Attack on 
civilian and civilian object during an 
attack on a legitimate military 
target will be considered as 
collateral damage and must not be 
carried out excessively in relation to 
the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated.35 In line with 
the provisions of Article 57(2)(a)(ii) 
Additional Protocol I (AP I) for 
selecting means and methods that 
can minimize damage and civilian 
casualties.36  
The significant role of AWS as a 
means of armed conflict does not 
34  ICRC, “New Technologies and Warfare. 7/9 
Interview with Marco Sassòli”, available at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=im9U9KR68Q
I (accessed on 28 April 2019). 
35  Article 57(2)(a)(iii) AP I; see also: Kenneth Anderson 
(et.al.), “Adapting the Law of Armed Conflict to 
Autonomous Weapon Systems”, International Law 
Studies, Vol. 90, 2014, p. 403; Prosecutor v. 
Stansilav Galić, Judgement and Opinion, Trial 
Chamber I, ICTY, IT-98-29-T, 5 December 2003, 
para. 58. 
36  William H. Boothby, Conflict Law: The Influence of 
New Weapons Technology, Human Rights and 
Emerging Actors, T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, 
2014, p. 114. 
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disengage from its obligation to 
ensure dual use object targets. For 
objects that have a dual use 
function, IHL requires precautions 
and cancellations and delays if the 
target is not a military object or the 
attack has been detected will cause 
excessive loss of life and material 
for civilians.37 This requires 
consideration based on a case-by-
case basis to cancel an attack or give 
a warning if it will cause a fall in 
civilian casualties.38 The description 
below is some precautionary 
measures that can be taken by 
military commanders and AWS 
weapons itself. 
First, if the commander is faced 
with two distinct means of warfare 
to engage the target, one is more 
accurate than the other, is he 
required to use the more accurate 
one? Military commanders must 
use all precautionary measures to 
minimize damage to civilian objects 
and the loss of lives of civilians. In 
certain circumstances, weapons are 
not suitable to be placed in certain 
condition considering it will affect 
weapon accuracy (e.g. environment 
and weather). In addition, military 
commanders is require to decide 
which munitions that do not lead to 
indiscriminate effects such as 
munitions containing nuclear, 
biological or chemical substances. 
Variants of various caliber 
ammunition, artillery munitions, 
and others were developed by the 
company following the 
development of various weapons 
                                                     
37  Article 57(2)(a)(i), (ii), (b), and (c) AP I. 
38  Michael N. Schmitt, “Autonomous Weapon 
Systems and International Humanitarian Law: A 
Reply to the Critics”,Op.cit., p. 19-20. 
39  PT Pindad (Persero), “Munisi”, available at: 
https://www.pindad.com/ammunition (accessed 
on 29 April 2019). 
40  John F. Murphy, “Some Legal (and a Few Ethical) 
Dimensions of the Collateral Damage Resulting 
from NATO's Kosovo Campaign”, on Andru E. Wall 
technology.39 The potential damage 
can be adjust to the desired shot, 
depends on the munitions carried 
by the weapon. For example, PGM 
in various military operations is not 
suitable for densely populated area 
or bomber with explosive weapons 
will cause greater damage 
compared to UCAV armed with 
bullets. Thus, the problem of 
excessive or not an attack all 
depends on the munitions, the 
propulsion method, the launch 
platform (land, ship, air), target, 
and distance. Military and 
humanitarian considerations 
through good faith and the military 
commander assessment play an 
important role to be carried out 
effectively.40 This is merely to 
anticipate civilian casualties. 
Second, sensors contribute in 
assessing targets based on direct 
situation to deliver military 
advantages with minimum loss and 
damage.41 Professor Marco Sassóli 
stated that, logically, if AWS can 
distinguish targets from the 
beginning, AWS should be able to 
abort attacks when there are 
situational changes that have the 
potential IHL violation.42 The use of 
AWS must fit the environment and 
location where the weapon is 
operated, especially in urban and 
residential area. Such weapon is 
placed in the battle zone (sea and 
air), as well as military areas – it can 
be a different matter. However, 
AWS can operate in the urban area 
with the prerequisite condition to 
(ed.), Lethal and Ethical Lessons of NATO’s Kosovo 
Campaign, International Law Studies, Vol. 78, 1998, 
p. 240-1. 
41  Article 51(5)(b) and Article 57(2)(a)(iii) AP I. 
42  Marco Sassóli, “Autonomous Weapon and 
International Humanitarian Law: Advantages, Open 
Technical Questions and Legal Issues to be 
Clarified”, International Law Studies, Vol. 90, 2014, 
p. 337. 
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cancel the attack on the possibility 
of civilian and civilian object in the 
course of the attack. Therefore, 
AWS in autonomous drones must 
have a sensor and identification 
system that performs similar or 
better compared to RPAS 
technology. 
 
3. Limitation and Restriction 
Based on the analysis mentioned abov
e, AWS is the latest technological 
breakthrough that has the potential to 
support the military performances is in 
accordance with the principles of 
military necessity, humanity, 
distinction and proportionality. There 
are some limitations for AWS such as 
selecting munitions, effective and 
appropriate weapon positioning and 
give warnings or abort attacks if the 
system identifies civilians and civilian 
objects. Therefore, AWS is expected to 
be one of the weapons choices that can 
be used lawfully and effectively for 
military forces with the intent and 
purpose to minimize the loss of civilian 
lives and damage of civilian object. 
The existing IHL principles were 
used as guidance for means of warfare, 
including for AWS, but it does not 
easily tell us what is best to do in 
difficult situation.43 These principles 
only serve as a guideline and make no 
attempt to elaborate in detail for AWS 
limitation in contemporary warfare. In 
order for AWS to make an effective 
contribution, regulations also needed 
which regulate the technical use. 
 
                                                     
43  Hugo Slim, Humanitarian Ethics: A Guide to the 
Morality of Aid in War and Disaster, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 2015, p. 44. 
44  1868 St-Petersburg Declaration, 1925 Geneva Gas 
Protocol, 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and 
on their Destruction, 1980 CCW, 1993 Convention 
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on 
their Destruction, Article 8(2)(b) paragraph (xvii) – 
(xx) Rome Statute 1998. 
C. Future Regulation For The Use Of 
Autonomous Weapon Systems In 
Armed Conflict 
 
Forming regulation regarding the 
development and use of AWS is a challenge 
in itself. There are many instruments 
regarding prohibition and restrictions on 
certain weapons such as prohibition and 
restrictions on specific weapons (chemical 
and biological weapons) based on 
international treaties44 and customary 
international law45 and general prohibitions 
and restrictions based on international 
treaties,46 customary international law47. 
However, there is no legal instrument that 
contains provisions relating to AWS. The 
need for special regulation on AWS is the 
key for AWS to get its position as a means of 
warfare. The following is an explanation of 
existing weapon review mechanism weak 
point based on Article 36 AP I and its 
urgency to form technical regulations. 
 
1. Weakness  of “Weapon Review” 
under Article 36 1977 of Additional 
Protocol I  
The existing mechanism for weapons and 
its features accommodated in Article 36 AP 
I, commonly referred to "weapon review", 
assessing the legality of all weapons used. 
Article 36 AP I stated that States parties 
must ensure the development, possession 
or use of a new weapon is not prohibited in 
some or all circumstances by international 
law. Article 36 AP I is necessary to be 
complement with Article 35 and Article 82 
AP I which beneficial to ensure the armed 
forces commit hostilities in accordance 
with IHL.48 
45  Rule 72-86; see: Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise 
Doswald-Beck, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law (Volume I: Rules), Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 251-296. 
46  AP I Provision, particularly Article 36 AP I. 
47  Rule 11-14; see: Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise 
Doswald-Beck, Op.cit., p. 37-50. 
48  ICRC, A Guide to the Legal Review of New Weapons, 
Means and Method of Warfare: Measures to 
Implement Article 36 of Additional Protocol I of 
1977, ICRC Mines-Arms Unit, Geneva, 2006, p. 5. 
Padjadjaran Journal of International Law  
Volume 3, Number 2, June 2019  
  
 
140 
 Article 36 AP I does not spell out the 
mechanism for the development or 
possession of new weapons. State parties 
assess whether new weapons are in 
accordance with IHL but the assessment by 
the state is invalid and ineffective 
internationally. Article 36 AP I require 
states to analyze each weapon that will be 
used at all time or only in certain 
circumstances but neglects the possibility 
of the weapon misuse.49 As a result, various 
weapons technical rules globally and left 
each country entirely makes its own 
assessment. These differences can arise 
from the fundamental aspect, for example, 
"autonomous" systems definition. United 
Kingdom (UK) defined "autonomous 
systems" as a system that has the ability to 
observe its environment and make a 
decision on an attack in a series of an 
alternative option without human 
supervision and control.50 The UK definition 
is more focused on Phalanx weapon as 
human-supervised AWS. Thus, the UK has a 
narrower understanding than the AWS 
definition according to the U.S.,51 all 
weapons with such system that can attack 
targets without human intervention.52 The 
difference generates ICRC concern when 
countries incapable of proper assess a new 
weapon or weapon of the future.53 
Dr. Vincent Boulanin affirms that 
"only few countries – less than 20 – have 
formal mechanisms related to the review of 
new weapons in accordance with Article 36 
                                                     
49  Yves Sandoz (et.al) (eds.), Commentary on the 
Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Geneva, 1987, para. 1469. 
50  United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, The UK 
Approach to Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Joint 
Doctrine Note 2/11, The Development, Concepts 
and Doctrine Centre, Shrivenham, 30 March 2011, 
para. 205. 
51  United States of America Department of Defense 
Directive, Autonomy in Weapon Systems, Number 
3000.09, 21 November 2012, p. 13-4. 
52  James Farrant and Christopher M. Ford, 
“Autonomous Weapons and Weapon Reviews: The 
UK Second International Weapon Review Forum”, 
International Law Studies, Vol. 93, 2017, p. 396. 
53  Thompson Chengeta, “Are Autonomous Weapon 
Systems the Subject of Article 36 of Additional 
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions?”, UC Davis 
of AP I."54 Developed countries have 
preferences implementing its military 
strategy relating to their national interests. 
Another issue that occurs is the lack of 
understanding of the requirements needed 
to assess new weapons, as well as a lack of 
resources such as financial, legal and 
technical experts. Many countries without 
hesitation entrust the legality of weapons 
acquired from the manufacturers.55 
Weapon review must be frame 
internationally to ensure that AWS is 
developing, produce, deploy and use in 
accordance with the provisions of 
international law and specifically IHL.  
 
2. Establishment of Specific Regulations 
regarding Autonomous Weapon 
Systems along with Technical Annex 
The most suitable legal instrument in 
regulating and setting standards for the 
development and use of AWS is establishing 
additional Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapon (CCW) Protocol. 
Adding Protocol on the CCW is the potential 
legal instrument in setting standards and 
considered the reasonable procedure in 
accommodating new weapons technology. 
The establishment of CCW Protocol I-III until 
Protocol V to the 1980 CCW on Explosive 
Remnants of War (Protocol V to the 1980 
CCW) signifies the dynamic development of 
CCW with weapons technological 
advancement.56 However, the CCW has 
advantages and disadvantages which lie in 
Journal of International Law and Policy, Vol. 23, No. 
1, 2017, p. 69-70. 
54  Stockholm International Peace and Research 
Institute [“SIPRI”], “Implementing Article 36 
Weapon Reviews in the Light of Increasing 
Autonomy in Weapon Systems”, available at: 
https://www.sipri.org/media/press-
release/2015/implementing-article-36-weapon-
reviews-light-increasing-autonomy-weapon-
systems (accessed on 16 February 2019). 
55  Vincent Boulanin, “Implementing Article 36 
Weapon Reviews in the Light of Increasing 
Autonomy in Weapon Systems”, SIPRI Insights on 
Peace and Security, No. 2015/1, 2015, p. 17. 
56  Kari Kahiluoto, “European Union General 
Statement at the Third Review Conference of States 
Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons”, Third Review Conference of States 
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the number of high contracting parties.57 
The CCW held annual meeting involved not 
only state parties, but also all countries, 
international organizations, and non-
governmental organizations. The main issue 
is that state parties negotiations failed to 
yield an agreement consensus on the 
addition of CCW Protocol and the states 
have a negative tendency in compliance 
commitment. The formation of new 
conventions is necessary if the mechanism 
process considered time-consuming or 
some countries have objected the proposal 
on the addition of a new protocol. 
Therefore, the addition of the CCW Protocol 
is promising since CCW has established 
Group Governmental Experts (GGW) to lead 
the negotiation process in response to the 
problems in finding solutions on AWS lack of 
rigid rules and have involved various 
stakeholders.58 In 2018 GGE Report on 
Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, there 
are six stages of procedure on a new 
weapon begin with the political discussion, 
weapon development, production, test, 
deployment, to post-use assessment.59 The 
six phases simplified into three, namely: the 
research and development (R&D); weapon 
test, evaluation, and verification; and 
deployment and use. Following is a concept 
of three stages of human-machine 
interaction in forming AWS standard. 
a. Strengthening Autonomous 
Weapon Systems Standard 
                                                     
Parties to the CCW, Geneva – Switzerland, 7-17 
November 2006, p. 2-3. 
57  The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons 
currently has a total  
of 125 States parties and 4 signatories (updated as 
at 14 November 2018); see: United Nations Office 
at Geneva, “High Contracting Parties and 
Signatories”, available at: 
https://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPa
ges)/3CE7CFC0AA4A7548C12571C00039CB0C?Op
enDocument (accessed on 23 May 2019). 
58  Fifth Review Conference of the High Contracting 
Parties to the CCW, “Report of the 2016 Informal 
Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous 
Weapons Systems (LAWS)”, CCW/CONF.V/2, 
Geneva – Switzerland, 12-16 December 2016, 
Annex, p. 14; see also: Bonnie Docherty (et.al), 
“Humanitarian Disarmament: The Way Ahead”, 
through Three Stages of Human-
Machine Interaction 
New weapons will proceed through 
various stages of human-machine 
interaction before can be used 
consistent with their capabilities. 
Interdisciplinary approach must 
involve in the process with an 
expert in legal, military, health, 
weaponry, and environmental 
which in each phase will have a 
different scope of regulation. 
International treaty law unable to 
cover all the rules in detail and 
technical, therefore national law 
and industrial standard provisions 
have to complement it. However, 
state must ensure that its 
provisions must be in line with the 
existing weapons law. Weapons 
must be approved and assessed for 
its legality in the process of 
development, possession, 
production, modification, and use 
based on the laws of armed conflict, 
national law, and international 
law.60 
1) Research and Development 
Phase  
The Protocol must be completed 
with a Technical Annex to give 
objectives detail to execute the 
articles of the Protocol. Technical 
Annex must be a standard during 
the weapons R&D, production, and 
Armed Conflict and Civilian Protection Initiative, the 
Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, and the Harvard 
Kennedy School’s Carr Center for Human Rights 
Policy Conference Summary Harvard Law School, 
Cambridge – United States of America, 5-6 March 
2018, p. 7 
59  Group of Governmental Experts of the High 
Contracting Parties to the CCW, “Report of the 2018 
Session of the Group of Governmental Experts on 
Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal 
Autonomous Weapons Systems”, 
CCW/GGE.1/2018/3, Geneva – Switzerland, 9-13 
April 2018 and 27-31 August 2018, p. 4; see also: 
Agenda item 6 (b). 
60  United States Department of the Air Force, Legal 
Review of Weapons and Cyber Capabilities, Air 
Force Instruction 51-402, 27 July 2011, para. 1.1.1. 
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test period. The implementation of 
the Technical Annex is voluntary as 
the guidance for the state parties 
much like as the Protocol V to the 
1980 CCW.61 Meanwhile, industrial 
standards and national law can 
complete with the technical annex 
if there are provisions that need to 
be deemed necessary to be 
regulated. The weapon R&D has the 
potential as domestic law 
enforcement equipment. For 
example, Riot Control Agents 
definition is accommodated on the 
1992 Chemical Weapons 
Convention which is prohibited 
from being used as a means of 
warfare but is legal to use and 
possess the weapon as riot control 
equipment for domestic law 
enforcement.62 AWS actually can 
operate in the course of the 
national defence system and 
offensive means of warfare for the 
purpose of attack, defence, and 
control of the masses. 
There are several factors that 
need to be considered during R&D 
to ensure that AWS does not have 
the potential to violate IHL. Before 
entering mass production, 
assessment must be carried out at 
the concept/design stage and 
technology development (through 
prototype testing).63 An example of 
comparison is the Maneuvering 
Characteristics Augmentation 
System (MCAS) technology on the 
Boeing 737 MAX which caused two 
fatal incidents and killed 346 people 
                                                     
61  Preamble Technical Annex Protocol V to the 1980 
CCW. 
62  Stuart Casey-Maslen, Neil Corney, and Abi Dymond-
Bass, “The Review of Weapons under International 
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law”, in 
Stuart Casey-Maslen (ed.), Weapons under 
International Human Rights Law, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2014, p. 416; see also: 
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons, “What is a Chemical Weapon?”, available 
at: https://www.opcw.org/our-work/what-
chemical-weapon (accessed on 18 February 2019). 
in less than six months. Federal 
Aviation Administration has not 
issued a final investigation report 
regarding the MCAS issue. Aviation 
stakeholders submitted initial 
reports related to the causes of the 
accident such as Boeing major 
design flaws, manufacturers only 
gave bare minimum of information 
and training regarding new 
technology to operator and pilot, as 
far as the indication of bias 
certification process.64 Therefore, 
state must understand and learn 
the sophisticated nature of the 
weapon produced on AWS 
weapons or manufacture 
improvement on several previous 
weapon designs. States must 
establish clear and structured 
technical regulations before a 
weapon is operating to avoid such 
mistakes. 
Technological innovation on 
R&D must introduce the "kill 
switch" function for such weaponry, 
which switches off the weapon 
main operation function. The 
presence of the technology is not 
designate for humans to intervene 
in system decision making. Kill 
switch function only used following 
an incident due to design flaws, 
weapon malfunctions, and 
threatened the national security or 
breach the military protocol, 
specifically on the irresponsible 
hands. Kill switch function 
activation is determined based on 
an "ethical black box"65 to records 
63  Marco Sassòli, International Humanitarian Law: 
Rules, Controversies, and Solutions to Problems 
Arising in Warfare, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 
Gloucestershire, 2019, para. 10.90. 
64  RSL Holdings, “Implications of the Boeing 737 MAX 
Problem for Autonomous Vehicle Design”, available 
at: https://rslholdingsinc.com/wp-
content/uploads/2019/03/RSL-Patent-Offering-
Supplemental-Note_3-19-19.pdf (accessed on 27 
April 2019). 
65  Identical to Flight Data Recorder; see: Alan F. T. 
Winfield and Marina Jirotka, “The Case for an 
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the sensor activity and internal 
system of the weapon. 
 
2) Test, Evaluation and 
Verification Phase 
Weapons will have to proceed on 
weapon testing, evaluation, and 
verification following the R&D 
stage. At this stage, potential errors 
on design flaws can be detected and 
regularly evaluated to ensure the 
system functions operate safely and 
effectively. Identification of 
weapon weaknesses must be 
resolved to minimize or eliminate 
the potential incidents on the 
operations.66 Optimal test 
procedure and evaluations allow 
primary identification for potential 
error and make continuous 
improvement since humans 
responsible for forming a reliability 
system.  
A weapon is just like an aircraft, 
made up of many individual 
components parts. Component 
produced by more than one 
manufacturer must be carried out 
test and evaluation in stages (e.g. 
sensor technology, ammunition, 
computing and information system, 
and software capabilities). After 
gain certification and approved for 
installation, the components are 
assembled into a single weapon 
device. Weapon testing must 
conduct in various conditions of 
battlefields to ensure weapons 
operation in accordance with the 
provisions of IHL. Therefore, the 
final phase at the test and 
evaluation phase is the certification 
issued by the manufacturer and 
states.  
 
                                                     
Ethical Black Box”, in Yang Gao (et.al) (eds.), 
“Towards Autonomous Robotic Systems”, 18th 
Annual Conference TAROS 2017, Guidford – United 
Kingdom, 19-21 July 2017, p. 262. 
3) Weapon Use and Deployment 
AWS must be determined by 
international treaty law in the form 
of articles within the phase of use 
and development. The outcome in 
the CCW Protocol does not prohibit 
AWS. In contrary, the CCW Protocol 
stipulates AWS in accordance with 
the IHL corridor. There are several 
provisions that must be 
accommodated through articles of 
the CCW Protocol, namely: 
a) The prohibition to deploy and 
use AWS on a dual-use object 
in densely populated areas 
(principle of proportionality); 
b) Make a warning if the target 
indicated the presence of 
civilian (principle of 
precaution); 
c) The weapon must treat the 
target as a civilian and civilian 
object on the uncertain 
military object (principle of 
distinction); 
d) Military commanders must 
ensure the exact type of 
weapon and munitions 
capabilities fit their 
designation, such as 
prohibiting the use of high 
explosive munitions in 
densely populated areas 
(principle of military 
necessity); 
e) In the event of weapon 
malfunction or design flaws 
that endanger civilians, state 
must halt the weapon 
operation and completely 
lock the operation function 
through the kill switch 
function; and 
f) All restrictions must be in 
accordance with the 
66  Harold E. Price (et.al), “The Contribution of Human 
Factors in Military System Development: 
Methodological Considerations”, U.S. Army 
Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social 
Science, Technical Report 476, 1980, p. 2-13. 
Padjadjaran Journal of International Law  
Volume 3, Number 2, June 2019  
  
 
144 
provisions and principles of 
IHL. 
Legal standard based on the 
CCW Convention in its Preamble 
and Article 1-11 of the Convention 
will be used in problem-related to 
ratification process and state 
compliance. However, all states can 
take references to CCW Protocol on 
AWS, primarily for developing 
states lack of resources to conduct 
weapons assessments. The 
encouragement in ratifying the 
protocol needs a long period of 
promotion and diplomacy to 
convince the state to make the 
Protocol a parameter in the use of 
AWS and standardization on 
development, research, and 
weapon testing. 
Parameter for standardization 
on development, research, test, 
and use of AWS must be 
determined. Specific instruments 
governing AWS in the form of CCW 
Protocol must be formed 
immediately as parameters in their 
use to reduce incident, unnecessary 
suffering, and war crimes. The 
provision is to set international 
standards and limits for the 
development and use of AWS, 
rather than to prohibit. It is 
preferable to provide specific 
regulation to respect IHL provision 
rather than prohibit from its use or 
development, based on two 
reasons: first, technological 
development helps the 
manufacturer to produced 
weapons easily; second, mass 
production without the 
international provision on the 
standard will cause potential 
danger and the threat of misuse. 
AWS great potential gives countries 
a huge advantage in hostilities 
despite hard to predict whether 
AWS could be one of means of 
warfare. Therefore, it is 
preposterous to prohibit the use 
and development of AWS for the 
sake of future weapon technology. 
It should be a collective 
responsibility to provide suitable 
and multilateral regulation through 
discussion. 
 
D. Conclusion 
AWS is a huge leap in military weapon 
systems that potentially exceeds human 
capabilities. However, this fact is  
insufficient to absolutely ban the use of 
AWS. Its features have better coverage on 
rough area operation (i.e. narrow passes, 
precipitous heights, positions at a great 
distance from the enemy). AWS is 
supported by various sensors and advanced 
technology to be able to support military 
operations while also increases civilian 
safety. To support the sensor, military 
commanders must select the exact 
munitions to minimize the effect or impact 
of the destruction. Therefore, for as long as 
AWS is capable to suspend or cancel an 
attack in the case that the sensor and 
information collected detect the target as 
civilians or civilian objects, the use of AWS 
shall not be prohibited. Basically, all 
conventional weapons could bring 
advantage or damage, depends on the user. 
With proper weapon’s standards and 
limitations that are carefully regulated in 
the binding IHL intrument, AWS will develop 
into a smart weapon that supports the 
armed forces in winning the war whilst also 
protect those who are not/no longer 
legitimate targets in IHL.  
For as long as standards and limitations 
of AWS are concerned, the future 
regulation shall provide detail technical 
provisions concerning development, 
production, ownership, the use and transfer 
of AWS during an armed conflict. This article 
further suggests that CCW Protocol and its 
Technical Annex are the proper 
international legal instruments for AWS.  
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